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It may seem old-fashioned to focus on bilateral relations in international studies 
nowadays. Bilateralism is rarely considered to be an issue in itself, and is often 
portrayed as a step towards something else – most notably multilateral dialogues 
or institutions. Yet, in this book, which is a redesigned version of her PhD thesis 
defended in 2015, Manon-Nour Tannous definitely challenges this view and offers a 
refreshing analysis of French-Syrian relations. In doing so, she offers one of the first 
academic pieces on these relations in the contemporary period, contributing both to 
historical debates – around the so-called French diplomatic expertise over Syria – 
and very current ones – the logics of the French position towards the Syrian conflict 
since 2011. 
The empirical contribution of Tannous’s work is striking. French-Syrian 
relations in the period following the independence of Syria in 1946 were very often 
overlooked in international studies. One may explain this either by the focus on 
the Mandate history between the two countries, or by the bipolar interpretation of 
interstate relations during the Cold War, which did not allow any reflexion on such 
a “banal” diplomatic relationship (p. 12) – between the French middle power trying 
to build its influence in the Middle-East, and the Syrian state often marginalised 
because of its “nuisance” strategies. Tannous deals with this issue by drawing on 
an impressive set of interviews with French and Syrian officials, and a collection of 
very informative archives. The conceptual contribution of this book is also worth 
expanding on, as a new insight is given on bilateral relations. Bilateralism is first a 
type of diplomatic practice, whose specificities consist of the limited amount of actors 
and the importance of informal relations between them – this is what constitutes the 
bilateral “method” (p. 17). These specificities allow these actors to substantively 
deal with a wide range of issues, and lead the author to consider the second aspect 
of bilateralism – the bilateral “content”. The French-Syrian relation is described as 
“unequal” (p. 21), “loosely institutionalized” (p. 22) and conducted by actors who 
are few in number. Tannous’s main thesis is that there is a “gap between the use of 
the bilateral framework as a method and the limited impacts on the strict French-
Syrian relations” (p. 17). According to her, the latter are to be understood through the 
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idea of “lever diplomacy” (diplomatie de levier, p.17), in which both actors use their 
relations with the other as a means towards third actors, issues and goals.
The concept of lever diplomacy is not irrelevant in the analysis of French-Syrian 
relations. It is heuristic in the way it encapsulates some of their underlying logics. It 
provides a very useful tool to interpret French strategy towards the Assad regime 
starting from 1970. Benefiting from the stability of the newly established regime, 
French actors of Foreign policy considered the possibility of establishing good 
relations with it, in a way that would, on the one hand, strengthen France’s  position 
on the war of 1973, and on the other enhance the rapprochement between Syria and 
Europe. These experiences were conclusive to an extent that, in order to conserve 
their good relations, French decision-makers went as far as minimising the role of 
Syria in the attacks launched by Syrian-backed groups such as Hezbollah, emergent 
in the 1980s. 
However, this concept does not pass the empirical tests suggested by the 
author. If French-Syrian bilateralism proved itself efficient in the 1996 international 
negotiations over Lebanon in a way that might have undermined American ambitions 
in the area at that time, the two countries were unable to find any agreement on 
Lebanese domestic issues later on, and would only collaborate briefly in the context 
of the War on Terror. This leads me to question the scope of lever diplomacy as a 
concept. Perhaps it is more a subjective category, rather than an objective one. Put 
another way, while being limited as an analytical tool of French-Syrian relations, it 
is definitely a useful tool to describe the way French decision-makers and diplomats 
framed Syria as a potential partner, or as Christian Lequesne would put it, where 
Syria was located in their “mental maps”.1 French diplomats actually used to see 
Syria as a lever, or a ‘Pivotal state’ in the Middle-East, and to consider, as Hubert 
Védrine puts it, that the “Syrian-Lebanese or Syrian-Israeli issue is fundamental” 
(p. 147). 
This is the main criticism I would address to this work: Tannous’s choice to focus 
on the ideas of bilateralism and lever diplomacy may overshadow the potential of this 
book as a diplomatic history of French-Syrian relations. When I mention diplomacy, 
I refer both to the spirit, the “essence”2 of diplomacy as being the activities whose 
purpose is the “management of separateness” between two entities or groups; and 
to the practices maintained to achieve this purpose.3 Among the latter, the gathering 
of information about the other party, dialogue and negotiations, as well as all the 
symbolic mechanisms; which show the other party that their political and cultural 
specificities are being considered. 
The separations between the Syrian and French states are plural. Firstly, there 
is a cultural separation, between two countries but also two diplomatic bodies, 
shown best by this celebration of the 14th of July hosted by the French Embassy in 
Damascus in 1972, during which the ambassador is surprised to notice that Syrian 
diplomats prefer by far drinking whisky rather than arak, the national alcoholic drink 
in Syria (p. 76). Secondly, this separation is ideological. How does one handle a 
relation with a partner who belongs to a regime whose nature is so different? Here, 
1 LEQUESNE, Christian. Ethnographie du Quai d’Orsay. Paris: CNRS éditions, 2017.
2  JÖNSSON, Christer, HALL, Martin. Essence of Diplomacy.  Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
3  SHARP, Paul. Diplomatic Theory of International Relations. Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009.
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French diplomacy stands out by its realism, making sure the Assad dynasty is stable, 
as its main concern is to remain in power, which makes it rather predictable. 
Finally, a structural separation, between a bureaucratic state and a state relying 
on different ‘asabiyya’: familial, tribal or communal networks which often prevail 
over official institutions and actors.4 Keeping this analytical framework in mind, 
it is possible to benefit from a considerable contribution from Tannous’s work. 
Indeed, without specifically naming it, it makes for a detailed and subtle narrative 
of the stages of a diplomatic relation between two originally opposed actors; from 
the encounter, the discovery, to the rupture, following the assassination of Rafiq al-
Hariri in 2005. 
The first chapter of the book is dedicated to “the building of an interstate relation” 
(La construction du relation interétatique, p. 29). The emphasis is focused on the 
means through which French and Syrian actors get acquainted and establish a trust 
relationship, and on France’s understanding of Syrian politics. A subtle depiction of 
domestic contexts and perceptions allow us to understand the nature of this encounter, 
rather than resorting to a bipolar analysis originating from the Cold War. The author 
expands on the French concern after Syrian independence to see a new elite emerge 
whose position vis-à-vis France is not clear, while the Syrian people, driven by a 
pan-Arabist impulse, worry about the Algerian situation until 1962. This date will 
eventually mark a shift in the process of acquaintance between the elites, and more 
largely the French and Syrian societies; that will earn Général de Gaulle a very 
favourable reputation among the Syrian public. 
In this light, the book also constitutes an important account of France’s 
developing understandings of Syria, which allowed France to acquire solid expertise 
on Syrian domestic politics, through which the rise of Hafez al-Assad would later be 
examined. Relying on “field diplomacy” (p. 203), this expertise enabled the French 
actors to understand their Syrian counterparts and to deal with them, despite their 
political differences. This is the exact opposite of the rising ‘neo-conservatism’ in 
American Foreign policy of the 1990s. 
Following this reflexion, I would say that the shift in French-Syrian relations 
happened before the cooling of 2003 – and the total rupture in 2005 – as is suggested 
by the author. Rather, one can find this shift in the Syrian policy of Jacques Chirac 
after Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000. Considering himself as the 
“tutor” (p. 156) of the new Syrian President, Jacques Chirac engaged a strong-willed 
policy towards Syria, encouraging economic and administrative changes, through the 
release of the Bechtel-Fournier report, and the opening of a “Syrian ENA” (p. 154), 
the ‘Institut national d’administration’ (INA). Tannous rightly observes the tendency 
to try to bring Syria closer to the French model at that time, but her approach takes 
it as an amplification, an “idealisation of bilateralism” (p. 168). Instead, a focus on 
diplomacy would allow for an interpretation in this new policy of a shift in the light 
by which the French position towards Syria following 2011 can be better understood. 
Moving away from diplomacy as the management of relations with a partner who 
is different, the French decision-makers tended to index their relations with Syria to 
the ability of the Syrian elite to resemble them, and to adapt to the evolving context 
of Foreign Policy – towards a more idealist approach. 
4  SEURAT, Michel. Syrie: L’Etat de barbarie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2012.
